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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objective of this report is to outline ways that the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Board (OCWMB or Board) can lead the 
catchment community in mutual efforts to increase returns to multiple 
ecological, economic and social objectives. The report lays out a set of 
recommendations regarding opportunities for consideration in future 
strategic planning in four areas of interest to the OCWMB: 
  conservation incentives; 
  urban water conservation; 
  groundwater and farm dam water allocation policy; and 
  voluntary environmental management arrangements. 
A portfolio of instruments to achieve the Board’s goals are considered 
including: 
  using incentives and education to encourage water conservation; 
  establishing environmental regulation; 
  using markets to move water to higher value activities within the 
catchment; 
  using tendering to make conservation programs more cost effective; 
and  
  promoting environmental management and accreditation systems to 
promote the best environmental management practices in the 
catchment area. 
Some of the strategies outlined would require action from Commonwealth, 
State government or local agencies to implement.  While the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Water Management Board doesn’t hold all of the levers to set 
these policies, the Board can have influence with well informed arguments 
for innovative policy reforms. This report is aimed at giving the Board 
strategic information it can use to lead initiatives and instigate new 
thinking. 
Conservation Incentives 
The largest single expenditure category in the 2001 Onkaparinga Catchment 
Water Management Plan is rehabilitation and management of waterways. 
Between 2000 and 2003, $3.15M (or 36% of the entire $8.75M three year 
budget) is earmarked for spending in this category (OCWMB, 2001). Most of 
this budget will be spent on land conservation cost-sharing incentives.  
Consequently this is a very important policy area for the Board to consider.  
Perhaps the most significant limitation of the current approach is that the 
return per cost-sharing dollar is less than could be achieved. This is because 
all cost-sharing payments are the same, irrespective of landholder 
willingness and capacity to contribute conservation effort. E XECUTIVE S UMMARY 
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This report describes an OCWMB opportunity to adopt a tendering system to 
conservation investment.  The tendering approach provides a mechanism 
enabling landholders who are willing to undertake conservation at less than 
the current cost-sharing rate the opportunity to do so.  
Last year in Victoria, a pilot program to allocate private landholder 
conservation funds through tender known as Bush-Tender was initiated. 
Evaluation of the first year of experience with the Victorian Bush-Tender 
approach found that approximately 33% more conservation effort was 
attained for the $400,000 conservation incentive expenditure than would 
have been with cost-sharing based on a single pre-set rate (Stoneham, 
Chaudhri, Ha and Strappazzon, 2002). Realising similar improvements in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment is possible. 
Opportunities may exist to fund development of such a tendering system 
through Commonwealth grants. Establishing pilot programs along these lines 
is a high priority of the emerging National Action Plan for Salinity and Water 
Quality – Market Based Instruments initiative.  
Urban Water Conservation  
Urban households and businesses use most of the reticulated water in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment area. Experience in Australia and other parts of the 
world suggest that incentive and educational approaches can produce 
significant urban water conservation benefits. Several policy changes and 
programming opportunities are identified in this report that the OCWMB, 
other government agencies and utilities can pursue to enhance urban water 
conservation in the catchment area including: 
1.  Expanding informational materials describing “best bet” 
household water conservation measures. At present the Board 
sponsors two voluntary information programs in the catchment area—
“Water Care” and the “Aware 2000 Sustainable Industry” program. 
Incorporation of information explaining financial returns to "best bet" 
conservation practices into these programs is likely to increase 
adoption. 
2.  Leading an effort to develop a "five frog" housing water efficiency 
rating program similar to the five star energy efficiency rating 
scheme used in the Australian Capital Territory. Mandating that 
potential homebuyers be provided with a water efficiency 
certification, as is done with energy efficiency certification in the 
ACT, would provide incentives for homeowners to make low cost 
water efficiency improvements.  
3.  Developing a landscape water demand management program In 
partnership with local government Councils or Utilities.  Such a 
program would involve an officer visiting businesses and public 
institutions with large irrigated grounds, performing an irrigation 
system hardware and management evaluation, making 
recommendations, and perhaps offering water saving technology 
investment financing or incentives. E XECUTIVE S UMMARY 
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4.  Encouraging water and energy performance contractors to focus 
on the Onkaparinga Catchment. This relatively new type of business 
involves private companies identifying areas where water use is 
inefficient and then entering into a shared savings agreement with 
water and energy users.  Typically, a water and energy performance 
contractor identifies ways to install water saving equipment, pays for 
the installation costs and then receives part of the value of the 
savings in energy and water consumption costs. 
Groundwater Policy in the McLaren Vale 
The current McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells Area (MVPWA) Water Allocation 
Plan balances tension between goals of maximising economic development 
returns and maintaining resource sustainability.  For example, the provision 
for water trade that allows the sale of water resulting from retirement of 
irrigated land or irrigation efficiency water savings encourages water to be 
moved to higher value used.  However, sustainability is ensured by 
prohibiting water trade into the area east of the Willunga fault line where 
additional withdrawals can potentially seriously and irreversibly damage 
existing groundwater rights. 
Research carried out for this report concluded that to date the restrictions 
on water use imposed on irrigators through the MVPWA Water Allocation Plan 
have not had significant adverse economic consequences. This, however, 
does not mean that aquifer use is now sustainable. Ongoing monitoring is 
necessary and, at some date in the future, it is likely that further changes in 
water allocations may be necessary.  
One improvement in water allocation rules that the OCWMB may wish to 
consider is denominating future allocations both as a share of Permissible 
Annual Volume (PAV – the sustainable annual volume of total aquifer 
withdrawals allowed in the water allocation plan) and as a water volume.  
This approach would put in place a mechanism for adjusting allocations in 
future water allocation plans. If monitoring shows that PAV has been 
overestimated then the share system facilitates adjustment of everyone’s 
allocation on a pro rata basis. 
Farm Dam Policy 
The question of the impact of farm dam development in the Onkaparinga is 
an issue of current interest. Conceptually, each dam that is installed in the 
catchment reduces the amount of water available to others and, also, 
changes the nature of environmental flows.   
One of the simplest approaches to limiting adverse impacts of farm dams is 
to cap farm dam development and make the issuance of new dam permits 
subject to off-set (tradable property right) provisions.  Under such an 
arrangement, in order to obtain a permit to construct a dam, an aspiring 
dam developer would have to off-set their proposed development by 
arranging to have another dam of equal or greater size in the same sub-
catchment removed.  Off-set provisions provide some flexibility for 
economic development in the future while maintaining controls over 
potential adverse impacts of development. E XECUTIVE S UMMARY 
   INCENTIVES, POLICY AND VOLUNTARY APPROACHES  PAGE 5 
There are two ways of achieving this outcome. The first is by once again 
recommending to the Government that they prescribe the entire 
Onkaparinga Catchment area. The second is to work with local government 
councils to achieve the same outcome via development controls. 
Voluntary Environmental Management Arrangements 
In recent years there has been emerging interest in voluntary environmental 
management arrangements (VEMAs) to encourage businesses to prove and 
improve their environmental management credentials.  Some VEMAs involve 
labelling and/or certification to allow businesses to demonstrate adherence 
to environmental standards.     
There are at least two opportunities that the OCWMB may wish to consider 
to encourage businesses in the catchment area to adopt voluntary 
environmental management: 
1.  In order to offer an incentive to participate in a VEMA the Board may 
wish to consider catchment levy and/or Council rate rebates. For 
example, rebates could be given to firms that participate in a VEMA 
that comply with the internationally recognised ISO14001 standard. It 
is proposed that having served the purpose of an implementation 
incentive, such rebates would be phased out.  This incentive would be 
in addition to the Commonwealth’s proposed income tax rebate of 
$3,000 for low income farmers who implement environmental 
management systems (EMSs). 
2.  Participating in the Commonwealth-funded pilot projects for EMSs in 
agriculture and allied rural industries.  The Commonwealth 
Government has committed to funding 15 pilot projects for developing 
EMSs in agriculture and allied rural industries across Australia.  The 
Board may wish to consider submitting a proposal to undertake such a 
pilot initiative within the Onkaparinga Catchment area in partnership 
with relevant State and Commonwealth agencies.  The aim of such a 
regional pilot project could be to foster on-farm development of EMSs, 
with relevant environmental performance guidelines, on enough farms 
within a catchment to investigate the potential of such on-ground 
activities in meeting catchment natural resource management goals. I NTRODUCTION 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report is the result of a CSIRO (Policy and Economic Research Unit) and 
Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board (OCWMB) research 
collaboration to examine cost effective policy and investment opportunities 
to better realise the five main goals of the OCWMB as expressed in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Plan, 2001: 
  rehabilitate and manage watercourses by implementing and promoting 
best practice environmental management; 
  maintain and enhance the quality of surface and groundwater; 
  use water sustainably and balance consumptive and environmental 
water uses for current purposes and future needs, and reuse water 
from non-traditional sources; 
  develop an aware and committed community through effective 
consultation and education programs, promote environmental 
responsibility within the community, and involve the community in 
environmental issues; and 
  integrate resource management through coordinated policies and 
effective partnership. 
Board efforts to achieve these goals produce direct and indirect economic 
benefits. The Board also seeks returns in the form of ecological and social 
benefits that are not directly traded in markets which include: biodiversity, 
water quality, water quantity and social, cultural and amenity values.  
Maximising returns to the Board’s investments requires coordinated action 
by multiple government agencies (i.e. the four Adelaide area catchment 
boards, DEH, DWR, SA Planning, SA Water and local government) catchment 
residents and agricultural and industrial businesses. As the agency primarily 
responsible for delivering significant improvements in the sustainable 
management of water resources in its area, the OCWMB has significant 
opportunity to lead coordinated policy initiatives.  
The objective of this report is to investigate opportunities to increase joint 
returns to shared goals of the OCWMB, state and local government agencies, 
the community, primary producers and industries in the Onkaparinga 
Catchment Board area. The report outlines possibilities to address water and 
land management concerns in the Onkaparinga CWMB area using five 
approaches:  
  using incentives and education to encourage water conservation; 
  establishing environmental regulation; 
  using markets to move water to higher value activities within the 
catchment; 
  using tendering to make conservation programs more cost effective; 
and  
  promoting environmental management and accreditation systems to 
promote the best environmental managers in the catchment area. I NTRODUCTION 
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This report outlines specific ways that the Board can lead the catchment 
community in mutual efforts to increase returns to multiple ecological, 
economic and social objectives in four areas of interest to the OCWMB: 
1.  conservation incentives; 
2.  urban water conservation; 
3.  groundwater and farm dam water allocation; and 
4.  voluntary environmental management arrangements. 
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2. CONSERVATION INCENTIVES 
The largest single expenditure category in the 2001 Onkaparinga Catchment 
Water Management Plan is rehabilitation and management of waterways. 
Between 2000 and 2003, $3,15M (or 36% of the entire $8,75M three year 
budget) is earmarked for spending in this category (OCWMB, 2001). Most of 
these expenditures are for conservation cost-sharing incentives.   
Consequently this is a very important policy area for the Board to consider.  
Perhaps the most significant limitation of the current approach is that the 
return per cost-sharing dollar is less than could be achieved. Currently, 
many landholders would be willingness provide more conservation for the 
cost-sharing money they receive. 
This section describes an OCWMB opportunity to adopt a tendering system to 
conservation investment similar to the Bush-Tender program recently piloted 
in Victoria.  The approach ensures that landholder’s willing to offer 
significant conservation for less than current cost-sharing rates do so by 
bidding for funds.  
Evaluation of the first year of experience with the Victorian Bush Tender 
approach found that the agency attained approximately 33% more 
biodiversity protection effort for its $400,000 cost-sharing expenditure than 
it would have had it cost-shared at a single pre-set rate (Stoneham, 
Chaudhri, Ha and Strappazzon, 2002). Realising similar improvements in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment is possible. 
2.1.  The Challenge of Redesigning Cost-sharing 
The challenge for the Board is to find a way to allow landholders in the 
catchment area who are willing to undertake conservation effort at less than 
current cost-sharing rates to do so.  With a cost-sharing system based on 
willingness and capacity to contribute, levels of conservation effort 
currently achieved could be realised with less spending. The result would be 
additional budget dollar available to finance other activities.  
The essence of the problem with the current cost-sharing approach is 
illustrated in Figure 1 on the next page.  The figure shows seven 
hypothetical cost-sharing program participants. Each receives the same $50 
cost-share for fencing 100 metres of stream-bank. However, many of the 
landowners would be willing to fence 100 metres for less than $50. 
Landowner 1, for example, is willing to donate her own time to do the 
fencing and simply requires the $15 she would need to buy the 100 metres of 
fencing material. The minimum cost-share she would accept is the blue 
portion of the landowner 1 bar in figure 1.  The red portion of the landowner 
1 bar in figure 1 is the payment, in excess of what she requires, that she 
receives when she accepts the standard $50 cost-share. 
As the blue “minimum cost” bars in Figure 1 illustrate, most of the cost-
sharing program participants would be willing to undertake the fencing for 
considerably less than a $50 cost-share. As the red “excess payment” bars 
illustrate, the cost-sharing agency pays significantly more than the minimum C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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program participants would be willing to accept to carry out the fencing. By 
replacing the current cost-sharing system with a tender based bidding 
system the Board could realise considerable savings.  
With a tender system, landholders “bid” the minimum cost-share they are 
willing to accept.  Lowest bids for equal value conservation services are 
funded first.  In the example case, landowner 1 would undertake the fencing 
for a $15 dollar cost-share saving the cost-sharing agency $35, landholder 2 
would offer to fence for $18, saving the cost-sharing agency $32 etc. In the 
most sophisticated systems, the agencies assign higher value to bids from 
landowners in high environmental priority areas. 
Figure 1  Hypothetical Minimum Acceptable Cost-shares to Fence 100 Metres of 


















Figure 1 portrays a hypothetical example with only one cost-sharing activity, 
stream bank fencing. In real cost-sharing programs, potential participants 
can offer to mix and match multiple activities and agencies value similar 
activities more in areas of higher ecological priority.  Consequently, a 
somewhat complicated procedure is needed to order bids by their 
“environmental value” per cost-share dollar. 
Fortunately, many of the challenges of implementing a tendering approach 
have already been worked through in the Victorian Bush-Tender trial 
program. This trial approach is explained below to give the Board a sense of 
what would be required to implement tendering in the Onkaparinga 
Catchment area. 
2.2.  The Victorian Bush-Tender Trial 
The Victorian Department of Natural Resources (DNRE) has recently 
established a tendering approach to allocation of land conservation cost-
sharing known as Bush-Tender.  The system is currently being trialled for a 
three year period at two pilot sites in Victoria compromising an area of some C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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3,600 square kilometres (DNRE, 2001). The basic idea is that potential 
participants working with program officers prepare a plan describing on  
ground works they are willing to offer. After preparing plans potential 
participants submit a sealed bid stating the cost-share payment they would 
be willing to accept to carry out the plan.  The DNRE then sorts the bids on 
the basis of cost-share dollars per unit of ecological value. The result is an 
ordered bar graph of willingness to accept cost-share payment offers similar 
to what is illustrated in Figure 1 above.  Finally, the DNRE accepts cost-
sharing offers in order of value of ecological benefits per cost-sharing dollar 
until the program budget is exhausted. 
Briefly stated, the approach involves five steps:  
1.  The cost-sharing agency sorts land in the area with a conservation 
priority score based on site-specific criteria (for example quality and 
ecological significance of native vegetation and extent of connected 
remnant vegetation on adjacent property). The basic objective is to 
develop a systematic method of giving the same activity (e.g. fencing 
remnant vegetation) a higher value per cost-sharing dollar in higher 
biodiversity priority areas.  
2.  The cost-sharing agency develops an on-ground works score system to 
quantitatively express the value they place on alternative works.  For 
example, the agency may assign a point score of 60 for the act of 
fencing a hectare of remnant vegetation while maintaining weed 
control in the fenced area may be assigned a score of 12 points per 
hectare. The basic idea is to give the agency a single metric for valuing 
the “environmental value” per hectare of a range of alternative on-
ground works a landholder could undertake. The scoring system also 
helps program officers communicate the relative value of the various 
on-ground works that can be undertaken by potential program 
participants. 
3.  Landholders develop a draft conservation plan and price they are 
willing to accept to implement the plan. Landholders are guided in this 
process by information from DNRE field officers explaining the relative 
value of conservation actions expressed as the scores developed in 
step 2.  
4.  The cost-sharing agency chooses bids to fund based on the 
environmental value for each bid derived using the formula:  
environmental value = 
(conservation priority score) X (on-ground works score). 
5.  The agency plots an environmental value offer curve on a graph like 
figure 2 below. The graph is used to identify the bid offering greatest 
environmental value per cost-sharing dollar for funding first. 
Successive bids are then chosen for funding in order of environmental 
value per dollar until all funds are allocated. C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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To understand the real advantage of using a Bush-Tender approach in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment area, consider the example of the hypothetical 
offer curve in figure 2. Suppose that the Board was able to fund offer 1 from 
a landholder willing to provide 220 units of “environmental value” at 
$4.50/unit, offer 2 from a land holder willing to provide 280 units of 
“environmental value” at $4.65/unit, through offer 18, from a land holder 
willing to provide 150 units of “environmental value” at $12/unit before the 
cost-sharing budget was exhausted.  The total cost to the Board would be 
the area under the environmental offer curve up to 1400 units.  
To attain the same level of on the ground works with a traditional cost-
sharing approach the Board would have had to offer a $12/unit cost-share 
(the minimum cost-share that the last participant would have accepted) to 
all program participants. The additional cost for the traditional cost-sharing 
approach would be the hatched area under the single cost-sharing rate line 
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2.3.  Conservation Incentive Policy Opportunities 
There are several benefits of introducing a tendering approach to 
conservation incentive allocation that speak for adopting this approach in 
the OCWMB area. 
1.  Experience in Victoria suggests that the Board could expect large 
increases in conservation effort to result. Perhaps as much as one third 
more conservation effort for each Board dollar spent on cost-sharing 
could be expected. 
2,  Implementing a tendering system requires developing a conservation 
priority scoring system to identify highest priority areas of the 
catchment for conservation activities.  As a result funds can be more 
effectively targeted. 
3.  Implementing a tendering system requires developing a system to 
evaluate the conservation value of a range of on-ground works and 
educate landholders in the process of helping them prepare bids. As a 
result the community receives precise information about the 
conservation practices that they can take that contribute most. 
 
As the description above suggests, implementing a Bush Tender type 
system involves significant implementation effort including development 
of: 
  a system for scoring the environmental value of mixed and matched 
packages of on-ground works; 
  site inspection, bid development and monitoring protocols; 
  educational programming efforts to familiarise landholders with the 
system; and 
  administrative systems for evaluating bids, enforcing contracts and 
managing records. 
Dealing equitably with existing commitments may require meeting existing 
implied obligations to cost-share under current rules. Thus a “phase-in” 
approach to a tendering system might be necessary.   
One possibility the Board may wish to consider is positioning to become 
the site of a pilot tendering program fund under the proposed 
Commonwealth Market Based Initiatives Program.  The National Action 
Plan for Salinity and Water Quality is currently developing a Market Based 
Instruments (MBI) initiative (NAP, 2001).  The intent of the program is to 
increase the use of market based instruments like tendering in government 
programs aimed at salinity, water quality and biodiversity issues. The aim of 
the initiative is to demonstrate how environmental objectives can be 
achieved more cost effectively. The initiative is currently in an embryonic 
state of development.  It will eventually fund MBI trials by agencies that can 
demonstrate the benefits of MBI “best practice” on a large scale, and serve 
as examples for the rest of the Commonwealth. The OCWMB could position C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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itself to become a Commonwealth funded tendering pilot program site by 
showing interest to State Government officials in becoming involved in the 
MBI initiative and by demonstrating capacity to implement such an 
approach. C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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3. URBAN WATER CONSERVATION 
Approximately 74% of total reticulated water use in the OCWMB in the 
1998/9 fiscal year was by urban residents.  The Onkaparinga Catchment 
Water Management Plan, 2001 projects an additional 18% growth in area 
population over the next decade. The result will be growing demand for 
water and water infrastructure and growth in associated environmental 
impacts.  
Some opportunities to conserve water are under direct control of the Board; 
realising other conservation opportunities would require the Board to 
convince others of the need for change. The CSIRO-PERU report prepared for 
the OCWMB on water pricing (Hatton MacDonald, Young and Connor, 2001) 
identified several ways to encourage reticulated water conservation through 
pricing including:  
  increases in the volumetric (per kL) component of water charges; 
  charges related to sewage volume in sewerage pricing; and 
  higher peak-season water prices. 
These pricing opportunities are issues that need to be raised with other 
Boards and with State Government representatives. They are not actions the 
Board can take unilaterally. In addition to pricing policy changes, there are a 
range of incentive and educational approaches that can significantly reduce 
water use and the environmental impacts of water use. This section outlines 
a range of incentive and educational opportunities to encourage households, 
businesses, and public institutions in the Onkaparinga Catchment Board area 
to conserve water.  
3.1.  Onkaparinga Urban Water Conservation Opportunities 
Several of the best opportunities to encourage water conservation in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment area involve what water and power utility 
companies refer to as “demand management” programs. Typical household 
water demand management programs involve utility companies offering 
households audits and reports that identify cost saving opportunities to 
retrofit houses with water saving hardware like 6/3 dual flush toilets, low 
flow shower heads and sink aerators. In some cases the utility companies 
provide financing or cost-sharing incentives for households to install water 
saving equipment. Box 1 provides information on implementation and 
economics of several household demand management programs. Their 
implementation requires a shift in the culture of water utilities from focus 
on the sale of water to the delivery of high quality water services at the 
least cost. C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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Box 1  The Economics of Household Demand Management Programs 
In Lismore NSW and Kalgoorlie-Boulder SA, mains water demand fell by 9.2% 
and 11% respectively through aggressive demand management programs 
involving retrofitting homes with dual flush toilets, low flow shower heads, 
sink aerators and garden water timers. An analysis by Allen and Pezzanti, 
2001 suggests that a 10% reduction in mains water demand would be a 
reasonable expectation in the Onkaparinga and other Adelaide area 
catchments for an aggressive domestic water demand management program 
similar to those undertaken in Lismore or Kalgoorie-Boulder.  
Implementing such approaches were presumably attractive to the utilities 
that sponsored them because they were cost effective.  Skeel and Hill (2000) 
found the life cycle cost of showerhead and aerator installations that took 
place as the result of Seattle’s demand management program cost about 
US$0.07/kL of water saved while a new water supply would have cost 
US$0.34/kL. 
Evaluation of the benefits of the Kalgoorie-Boulder demand management 
program found that “the financial benefits in reduced operating and capital 
costs will more than make up for the financial costs. Based on the original 
$2.3 million budget, the projected savings to the Water Corporation are $3.5 
million and to the customer are $2.8 million over a 2.5 year period”. (WSSA, 
1998 as quoted in Allen and Pezzanti, 2001) 
 
All demand management approaches have several characteristics that make 
them appealing to consumers. 
1.  Voluntary participation is one advantage of demand management. 
Instituting voluntary incentives, water audits, and educational 
approaches tends to encounter little public resistance as non-
participants experience little impact and those who do participate 
typically do so because they perceive a benefit. 
2.  Demand management is often cost effective from the water user's 
perspective. The approach overcomes information, scepticism and 
high discount rate constraints that typically inhibit residents, 
businesses and public institutions from making money saving 
efficiency management changes and investments.
 1 
                                             
1 Information constraints are the cost of researching returns to efficiency 
investments; high discount rate constraints refer to unwillingness to make 
conservation investments unless savings payback initial invests in very few years. 
The two quotes below are with respect to the apparent unwillingness of firms to 
make cost saving energy technology investments.  However, the quotes capture the 
essence of the two main reasons that both private firms and households fail to 
invest in water conservation even when it is profitable. 
"The lack of easily accessible information on the availability and/or economic and 
technical viability of energy-efficiency measures under full-scale, actual usage C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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Four variants of demand management programs that are potentially viable in 
the Onkaparinga Catchment area are summarised below. They range from 
relatively low cost activities that the Board can undertake itself through to 
major programs initiatives that the State, councils, utilities or businesses 
can undertake. 
1. The OCWMB could consider expanding informational materials 
describing “best bet” household water conservation measures. At the 
present the Board sponsors two voluntary information programs in the 
catchment area. The “Water Care” program is aimed at encouraging 
household water conservation and the “Aware 2000 Sustainable Industry” 
program is aimed at encouraging eco-efficiency including water conservation 
and waste water minimisation in small businesses
2.  Presently, neither 
program provides significant information that explains financial savings that 
can be realised by people who adopt “best bet” measures. Incorporation of 
such information into these programs is likely to increase adoption. 
2. The Board could lead an effort to develop a "five frog" household water 
efficiency rating program similar to the five star energy efficiency rating 
scheme used in the Australian Capital Territory.
 3  The five star system, 
introduced in 1998, classifies each house according to the degree to which it 
is designed to conserve energy.  Essentially, the less glass, the more double 
glazing, the more insulation, etc., the higher the rating is. The intent is to 
force all owners to pay attention to the energy efficiency of their home. The 
ACT energy rating legislation requires that no house may be sold without 
first obtaining a rating and drawing this rating to the attention of the 
purchaser before a contract is signed.  
Conceptually, a water rating system similar to the ACT’s five star energy 
rating system could be developed for urban water use and trialed in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment area.  Under a so-called “Five Frog” system, a house 
water efficiency audit would be performed. This would involve assigning 
                                                                                                                     
conditions amplifies the scepticism. Smaller-sized firms in particular often do not 
even know about the specific technologies that are available. In particular, many 
small- to medium-sized industrial firms do not have the expertise on their staff nor 
the time to address energy efficiency in isolation from more strategic concerns. … 
… for most firms, capital is scarce. Because the links between improvement in 
energy efficiency and high priority goals such as improvements in plant productivity, 
product quality, environmental emission requirements, and labour and materials 
efficiency are generally not understood, energy-efficiency projects are considered 
non-strategic and take low priority when industrial firms allocate capital. A one- to 
three-year payback is often required for cost- saving investments such as energy-
efficiency projects. Capital rationing, a common budgeting approach, further 
hinders energy-efficiency investments, since fewer investments are undertaken that 
would be justified by more conventional budgeting analysis." (Jordan and Nadel, 
2001) 
2 A more detailed description of the Aware 2000 Sustainable Industry program is 
provided in the section of this report entitled Voluntary Environmental Management 
Arrangements. 
3 The ACT energy program is underpinned by the Energy Efficiency Ratings (Sale of 
Premises) Act 1997. C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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more points for higher efficiency water appliances. Points would be summed 
to reach a particular frog rating. One frog might be the current minimum 
building code requirements. The "five frog" rating would be reserved for 
houses characterised by water efficient appliances and wastewater disposal, 
storm water management and garden systems that minimise water use and 
waste water disposal.  
If the trial proves successful, the Board could recommend to the 
Government that it introduce legislation in SA similar to the ACT energy 
rating system. Consistent with the government's commitment to improve 
urban water use, the legislation would require that no house may be sold 
without first obtaining a water rating certificate.  This would ensure that 
any purchaser is made aware of the water efficiency of a house before 
signing a contract to buy it.  
In the Onkaparinga Catchment Board area and the rest of South Australia 
charges for sewage are based on property values.  These charges do not vary 
with water usage or sewage volume and thus act as a disincentive for 
conservation.  Metering sewage appears to be an expensive option.  Rating 
houses based on water efficiency would establish significant incentives for 
people to reduce sewage discharge.  
Another option for progressing the opportunity further would be to offer a 
sewage levy rebate based on an audit of the water efficiency of the house. 
For a "five frog" rating, the sewage charge might be divided by 5 and the 
household would pay only 20% of the current property-based charge.  All 
households would be required to pay some base amount because all 
households receive some benefit from the existence of the sewerage system. 
3. In partnership with local government councils or utilities the Board 
could develop a landscape water demand management program – Such a 
program would involve an officer visiting businesses and public institutions 
with large irrigated grounds, performing an irrigation system hardware and 
management evaluation, making recommendations and perhaps offering 
water saving technology investment financing or incentives. Nearly half of 
all water use in the Adelaide area in the summer months is for garden, park 
and lawn irrigation and anecdotal evidence suggests many systems are 
operated inefficiently (Allen and Pezzanti, 2001 and Bjornlund et al., 2001). 
Assessment of landscape irrigation demand strategies in Adelaide (Allen and 
Pezzanti, 2001 and Bjornland et al., 2001) and elsewhere suggest that a 
relatively small investment in urban landscape irrigation demand 
management programming could yield high conservation returns.   
A closer look at the economics of a Seattle, USA landscape irrigation demand 
management program is provided in Box 2.  The Seattle experience suggests 
that the key to developing a cost effective program in Adelaide would be a 
focus on technical assistance as opposed to financial incentives.   C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
   INCENTIVES, POLICY AND VOLUNTARY APPROACHES  PAGE 18 
Box 2  Urban Irrigation Demand Management Economics – The Case of the 
Seattle Water Efficient Irrigation Program 
The Seattle Public Utility (serving 1.3 million) Seattle Water Efficient 
Irrigation program (WEI) is an irrigation water demand management program 
available to all businesses, and public institutions that irrigate more than 1 
acre (0.4 ha) on a voluntary basis. The program includes: 
1.  An onsite irrigation audit to assess efficiency of irrigation equipment 
and maintenance;  
2.   A written report for each client outlining recommended changes in 
system management and capital investment; and 
3.  In some cases, cost-sharing for capital investment.  
Evaluation by Lawson (2000) of WEI experience between 1995 and 1998 shows 
that over the four year period the total program cost was around 
US$245,000, or approximately US$61,000 a year. Lawson’s estimated per unit 
cost of water savings was approximately US$0.215/kL, which was 
US$0.513/kL less than the cheapest source of additional water supply. 
While about 60% of the program budget was for incentives to encourage 
purchase of new irrigation hardware, only about 10% of total water savings 
resulted from the hardware.  90% of program water savings resulted from 
changes in irrigation management that clients adopted based on program 
officer recommendations.  This implies that 90% of the program water savings 
could have been achieved with a program based on auditing and management 
recommendations alone. Lawson concluded that highest program payoffs to 
the Seattle program, but also to urban irrigation programs in general, are 
from the information/education activities. 
 
4. The Board could encourage Water and Energy Performance (WEP) 
contractors to focus on the Onkaparinga Catchment. This relatively new 
type of business involves private companies identifying areas where water 
use is inefficient and then entering into a shared savings agreement with 
water and energy users.  Typically, a WEP contractor identifies ways to 
install water saving equipment, pays for the installation costs and then 
receives part of the value of the savings in energy and water consumption 
costs. An example of a shared savings agreement between a private WEP 
contractor and an Atlanta, USA public housing project is provided as Box 3. 
The concept of shared savings agreements is alive and well in the Australian 
energy sector where the Australian Energy Performance Contracting 
Association (AEPCA) web site
4 lists 18 member energy service companies. As 
far as we are aware, extension to the water sector has yet to occur. 
 
                                             
4 http://www.aepca.asn.au/index.html C ONSERVATION I NCENTIVES 
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Box 3  Shared Saving Agreement Example -The Housing Authority of the City 
of Atlanta (AHA) 
AHA signed a contract with the Water & Energy Savings Corporation (WESCo), 
of Lake Lure, North Carolina, USA on June 30 1998, that involves nine high-
rise sites with a total of 1,923 units. The contract between the public 
institution and the private contractor is a shared savings agreement. Under 
the agreement investment in water and energy efficiency is provided with no 
initial cost to the housing authority. The investment will be repaid to the 
contractor as water and energy costs saving are realised.  
" The energy and water conservation measures will include the following: 
heating and air conditioning equipment, individual metering, lighting 
upgrades, window and panel replacements, low-volume flush toilets, and 
low-flow showerheads and faucet aerators for all units. Both water-source 
and air-to-air heat pumps will provide the space conditioning. Also planned 
are central gas boilers for domestic hot water heating and a sonic water-leak 
detection system.  
The total cost for the energy and water conservation measures will be 
US$4.64 million, with WESCo financing at 4.2%. The measures are expected 
to yield annual savings of US$900,000, and WESCo has guaranteed these 
savings over the 12-year contract.”  
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4. GROUNDWATER WATER IN THE MCLAREN VALE 
Provisions of the Water Resources Act, 1997 delegate most of the 
responsibility for water allocation planning in the McLaren Vale Prescribed 
Wells Area (MVPWA) to the OCWMB. The challenge the Board faces is to 
design water allocation rules that ensure sustainable aquifer use, but also 
succeed in not limiting the economic development value of water in the 
region.  
This section begins by describing the situation that led to groundwater 
resource prescription in the area and the approach to limiting groundwater 
extractions that the Board put in place with the first MVPWA water 
allocation plan. Then water market data from the area is examined to 
determine whether the MVPWA water allocation rules have created 
significant rises in the price of water and whether rule modifications deserve 
consideration in future plans. The conclusion is a set of recommendations 
regarding changes to future MVPWA water allocation plans that the Board 
may wish to consider.  
4.1.  The Situation Leading to Groundwater Resource Prescription 
The McLaren Vale Prescribed Wells Area, approximately 320 square 
kilometres, is the only area in the Onkaparinga Catchment area that is 
prescribed under the Water Resources Act 1997.  Groundwater in the area 
was prescribed because there was concern that withdrawals were taking 
place at an unsustainable rate. Investigation leading to groundwater 
prescription over three irrigation seasons (1996/97 to 1998/99) estimated 
total average extractions in the area prior to prescription at 7010 ML/year.  
The investigation suggested that this level of extraction was probably not 
sustainable. The conclusion of background investigation was that “slight 
falls in groundwater levels … evident in all aquifers indicate that some 
reduction … in current rate of extraction is required.” (OCWMB, 2000, p.8). 
As a result the OCWMB was given the responsibility of developing a McLaren 
Vale Prescribed Wells Area Water Allocation Plan that would include water 
allocation rules for individual irrigators extracting groundwater. The plan 
was to be consistent with achieving an overall maximum annual quantity of 
water extractions less than 7063 ML prior to July 2003, and 6600 ML after 
July 2003.  
4.2.  Current MVPWA Water Allocation Approach 
Prior to prescription, groundwater allocation had been described on a per 
hectare basis with no explicit limit on the quantity of water per hectare that 
could be withdrawn.  Groundwater extraction was not metred in all parts of 
the MVPWA prior to prescription, so installation of meters by all irrigators 
who wished to extract groundwater was the first requirement of the plan. In 
an attempt to develop an equitable set of rules for sharing the groundwater 
resources in the area and limiting extractions to a sustainable level, the 
Board developed a set of rules describing water allocations on a volume per 
hectare per year basis. These water allocation rules are summarised in  
Table 1. As inspection of the table shows, allocations will be reduced after 
2003. Effectively, the Board has moved to first cap groundwater use in the 
MVPWA and then reduce the size of this cap. G ROUNDWATER WATER IN THE M C L AREN V ALE 
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In order to allow groundwater extractions to be relocated within the area 
from lower to higher value uses, the Board included provisions in the MVPWA 
Water Allocation Plan to allow the transfer of water allocations. However, it 
was deemed necessary to include restrictions on trades that could harm 
existing water licence holders.  Specifically, rules prohibit allocations being 
traded into the area east of the Willunga fault line. Uncertainty of aquifer 
connectivity east of the fault line means that additional withdrawals in the 
area can harm existing licence holder interests seriously and irreversibly 
(Barret, 2001). Box 4 summarises the details of provisions prohibiting water 
trade that could harm existing licence holders. 
Table 1  Water Allocations by Crop Type 
Crop and Plan 
Dates Water  Allocation 
   Metered Area  Non metered area 
Prior to July 2003 
Grapevines  Lesser of 1.5 ML/ha or 3 year avg. 
volume/ha* 
1.28 ML/ha 
Other crops  Lesser of 2.98 ML/ha or 3 year avg. 
volume/ha* 
2.98 ML/ha 
Areas planted with 
a mixture of 
grapevines and 
other crops 
Lesser of 1.5 ML/ha or 3 year avg. 
volume/ha* for each ha in area planted 
to grapevine and lesser of 2.98 ML/ha or 
3 year avg. volume/ha* for each ha in 
area planted to other crops 
1.28 ML/ha  for each ha 
in area planted to 
grapevine and 2.98 
ML/ha for each ha in 
area planted to other 
crops 
After July 2003     
Grapevines**  1.1 ML/ha  Not applicable 
Other crops**  1.1 ML/ha plus amount by which 3 year 
avg volume/ha* exceeded 1.2 ML/ha up 
to a maximum additional 1.6 ML/ha 
Not applicable 




1.1 ML/ha for each ha in area planted to 
grapevine and 1.1 ML/ha plus amount 
by which 3 year avg volume/ha* 
exceeded 1.2 ML/ha up to a maximum 
additional 1.6 ML/ha for each ha in area 
planted to other crops 
Not applicable 
*3 year avg. volume/ha refers to average volume of water used per hectare over the 
three year period commencing 1 July, 1996 
** Growers with 3 year average annual volume/ha less than 1.1 ML/ha for each ha in 
grapevine and 2.7 ML/ha for each ha in other crops may be eligible for an additional 
amount to bring their total up to 1.1 ML/ha for each ha in grapevine and 2.7 ML/ha for 
each ha in other crops respectively. 
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Box 4  Provisions of the MVPW Area Water Allocation Plan to Protect Third 
Party Water Rights (sections 3 and 4 of the Plan) 
”  … 
3)  Where there is a change in the proposed location of the point of 
extraction, groundwater may only be transferred where: 
a)  the location of the proposed new point of extraction does not move 
to a stressed area; and 
b)  the taking of water from the proposed new point of extraction will 
not result in a level of aquifer stress greater than the level of 
aquifer stress caused by the taking of the same amount at the 
original point of extraction; and 
c)  the taking of water from the proposed new point of extraction will 
not lower the level of underground water to a level that will 
detrimentally affect the ability of other persons to lawfully take 
from that underground water, or detrimentally affect any ecosystems 
that depend on that underground water; and 
d)  the taking of water form the proposed new point of extraction will 
not cause a decrease in the amount or duration of discharge from the 
underground water to streams or springs and will not detrimentally 
affect any ecosystems that depend on that discharge; and 
e)  the taking and use of water from the proposed new point of 
extraction will not cause degradation of the land from under which 
the water is taken or on which it is used by way of increased soil 
salinity, soil erosion or any other means; and 
f)  the location of the proposed point of extraction does not move from 
a point east of the Willunga Fault line to a point west of that line. 
4)  For the purposes of clause 3, "stressed area" means 
a)  an area where underground water salinity has increased at an 
average rate of 100 mg/L (TDS) over the previous 3 years; or 
b)  an area where the depth (below ground level) to underground water 
has increased at a rate of at least one metre over the previous three 
years.” 
Source: OCWMB 2000, p.22  
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4.3.  The First MVPWA Groundwater Water Allocation Plan 
The Board may wish to consider modifying MVPWA water allocation rules if 
future aquifer monitoring results reveal that groundwater levels in the 
MVPWA are continuing to decline. The recommendations in the following 
section include a suggested method of adjusting allocations based on 
periodically updated information on the rate of groundwater extraction that 
is sustainable.  
This section evaluates whether the Board may want to consider updating 
MVPWA water allocation and trade rules because the private costs of 
complying with the rules can be reduced without reducing resource use 
sustainability or imposing costs on third parties.  
Tension between goals of maximising groundwater resource based economic 
development and maintaining resource sustainability are addressed in the 
current MVPWA Water Allocation Plan in a number of ways:  
  the volume of water that irrigator can extract is limited; 
  surplus water allocations resulting from both retirement of irrigated 
land and increased efficiency of irrigation are tradeable; and 
  water trade east of the Willunga fault line is prohibited because 
additional withdrawals might seriously and irreversibly harm existing 
licence holder interests. 
Effectively, water use has been capped and all changes in water allocations 
must now occur via market processes. To test whether the cap on-
groundwater supply resulting from prescription adversely affected water 
based economic activity in the MVPWA, water prices in the area before and 
after prescription were compared. All other things being equal, rules that 
successfully cap use at its current level should result in minimal price 
change.
 5  
The results of this test support the hypothesis that plan implementation did 
not increase water price appreciably.
 Specifically, water price data showed 
that the price of the basic right to irrigate a hectare of grapes remained 
very nearly constant before and after groundwater prescription. Prior to the 
Water Allocation Plan, water rights were expressed in area terms and sold in 
the $5,000 to $6,000/acre ($12,400 to $14,800/ha) range.  Following the 
approval of the Water Allocation Plan, water began trading on a per ML 
basis.  Market prices appear to have settled in the range of $11,200 to 
$14,800 per ML.
6 
                                             
5    Market water prices used in this evaluation are based on personal 
communications with Martin Stokes, DWR and Duncan McDonald, a water 
trader/broker.  
6   This finding is based on the assumption that irrigators continued to view the 
basic commodity being traded as the water allocation required to grow a hectare of 
grapes. This is a reasonable assumption because reduction to a 1.1 ML/ha allocation 
probably did not limit yields for most growers. Some who increased irrigation G ROUNDWATER WATER IN THE M C L AREN V ALE 
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The main conclusion is that to date the restrictions on water use imposed on 
irrigators through the MVPWA Water Allocation Plan have not had significant 
adverse economic consequences. This, however, does not mean that aquifer 
use is now sustainable. Ongoing monitoring is necessary and, at some date in 
the future, it may be that further changes will be necessary.  
In anticipation of the need to signal that allocations may be changed in the 
future the OCWMB may wish to consider denominating future allocations 
as a share of Permissible Annual Volume (PAV)
7 in parallel with a definition 
in volumetric terms. Water allocations based on a share of PAV would be 
potentially advantageous as a mechanism for automatically adjusting 
allocations in future water allocation plans.  The approach is consistent with 
the Water Resources Act, 1997 allowance for adjustment of water 
allocations in a non-capricious manner. The main advantage is reduced 
licence holder uncertainty regarding the process by which water allocations 
will be adjusted in the future. The approach is being introduced in the Eyre 
Peninsula Catchment of South Australia and has been recommended to the 
South East Catchment Water Management Board. 
 
                                                                                                                     
efficiency as a result of reduced allocation may actually have experienced increased 
returns (Black and McCarthy, 1998).  
   There is some anecdotal evidence that most of the higher prices observed may 
have resulted from geographic restrictions on trade that made it difficult to move 
water into areas such as Blewitt Springs and locations east of the fault line.  As a 
result, sellers in these locations realized that allocations in these areas can sell at a 
premium as "new" water can not be moved in.  
  Of course, the Water Allocation Plan water use restrictions may have some 
adverse economic impact on landholders with an interest in expanding production of 
water intensive row and pome fruit crops.  To the extent that such crops require 
more than 1.1 ML of irrigation per hectare, new plantings will require purchase of 
more expensive water rights than would have been required in the past. However, 
the plan protects landholders who had water intensive crops in production prior to 
prescription by allowing them greater water allocations on water intensive crops. 
One likely consequence is acceleration of the already rapid rate of conversion to 
wine grape production in the region.   
7 Permissible annual volume is the total annual volume of allowable aquifer 
withdrawal in a groundwater allocation plan. PAV is based on what the best science 
suggests is a sustainable withdrawal rate, though the truly sustainable withdrawal 
rate is not known with certainty. FARM DAMS POLICY IN THE M T . LOFTY RANGES 
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5. FARM DAMS POLICY IN THE MT. LOFTY RANGES 
The question of the impact of farm dam development is an issue of current 
interest to the Board, catchment boards in other parts of South Australia and 
at least two other states.  Recently, both NSW and Victoria have introduced 
significant policy initiatives in this area. 
Conceptually, each dam that is installed in the catchment reduces the 
amount of water available to others.  As more dams are installed, less water 
flows into rivers and there is less aquifer recharge.  In addition, most small 
dams release water only after they fill.  Generally, this means that stream-
flow in summer and the early part of winter is less than it otherwise would 
be. Over the last 10 years, it has been estimated that there has been around 
a 10% increase in the total capacity of farm dams storage in the Onkaparinga 
and Torrens catchments (DWR, 2001). 
In some, but not all parts of the Onkaparinga Catchment, dam construction 
is now thought to be limiting the amount of water that can be taken from 
the catchment for consumptive purposes.  Moreover, even where this is not 
yet the case, it is foreseeable that this may be a significant concern in the 
future. 
This section of the report explores opportunities to use market-based 
instruments to improve the management of farm dams. 
5.1.  Recent Initiatives in Other States 
Two states have recently introduced new arrangements to manage farms 
dams.  Both states have essentially moved to “cap” dam construction and 
manage the remaining resource as a scarce resource of limited capacity.  
NSW has taken a regulatory approach while Victoria is taking a path that 
involves the use of market-based instruments.  In NSW, all landholders are 
entitled to harvest only a fixed percentage of water running across or falling 
on their land.  In Victoria, all water stored in dams used for irrigation is 
capped and tradeable.  For small dams this will be achieved via off-set 
policies where a new dam is not approved unless an existing dam is 
removed.  For larger dams, the introduction of metering and trade in water 
is being provided for in the policy. These recent initiatives provide examples 
of how the Onkaparinga Catchment Water Management Board could manage 
the effects of farm dams on water supplies and environmental water 
requirements in the catchment area.  
5.2.  Current legislative arrangements  
Conceptually, the impact of farm dam development in the Onkaparinga 
Catchment area, and elsewhere, can be controlled via two mechanisms. 
The Water Resources Act 1997 allows for management of farm dams in two 
ways: 
  prescription of water resources in an area and the requirement for 
drawing up subsequent water management plans for the prescribed 
resource area; and 
  permits for water-affecting activities. FARM DAMS POLICY IN THE M T . LOFTY RANGES 
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Additionally, farm dams development is controlled through Development Act 
1993 provisions requiring that: 
  a permit be obtained for a dam that will have “a wall, levee or mound 
greater than 3 metres in height or is greater than 5ML in volume or 
has a retaining wall over 1 metre or is located within the Hills Face 
Zone or a Flood Zone.” (DWR 2001); and   
  in instances where development approval is not required, a permit for 
dam construction is required. 
5.3.  Onkaparinga Catchment Farm Dam Policy Recommendations 
In an ideal world, the entire Onkaparinga Catchment area would have been 
prescribed and dam construction brought under the Board’s direct control.  
It is recommended that the Board once again approach the Minister and 
the Department for Water Resources with a recommendation that the 
entire catchment area be prescribed. Once this is achieved, it is suggested 
that an off-set policy be put into place for dams above a certain size and 
run-off ratio similar to that recently introduced in Victoria. Effectively, a 
moratorium would be placed on dam construction. 
In parallel with a recommendation for full prescription, it is also suggested 
that the Board work with local government councils. As summarised above 
local government councils have a wide range of control over farm dam 
impacts through the Development Act, 1997. For example, under the 
Development Act, 1997, councils have powers to make new dam 
development subject to conditions. In particular permits to build new dams 
could be subject to off-set (tradeable development right) provisions.  
Under such an arrangement, in order to obtain a permit to construct a dam, 
an aspiring dam developer would have to first show that they had provided 
for removal of another dam of equal or greater size in the same sub-
catchment. The advantage of off-set provisions is that they provide some 
flexibility for economic development in the future while maintaining 
controls on how the resource is accessed. 
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6. VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
In recent years there has been emerging interest in voluntary environmental 
management arrangements (VEMAs) to encourage businesses to improve and 
prove their environmental credentials.  Some VEMAs involve labelling and 
certification that allows firms to demonstrate compliance against a specific 
environmental standard and benefit by doing so. 
Clearly the OCWMB has an interest in promoting businesses in the catchment 
area that pursue good environmental management practices. This section of 
the report describes what voluntary environmental management 
arrangements are, how they can be used to improve environmental 
management and opportunities for the OCWMB to promote the use of 
voluntary environmental management arrangements. 
There are at least three good reasons to believe that OCWMB support for 
voluntary programs can yield significant improvements in catchment 
resource management sustainability that other approaches might not. 
1. Information/education  based  voluntary programs show businesses and 
households ways to make “eco-efficiency” management changes—
management changes that both enhance environmental performance 
and save costs.  The households or businesses that participate and 
realise eco-efficiency gains generally would not in the absence of a 
voluntary program, because they would not make the necessary 
information/education investment on their own. 
2.  Many of the businesses and households who participate in voluntary 
programs are first movers who are willing to undertake environmental 
action beyond regulatory requirements when the information that is 
prerequisite to such actions is offered through voluntary programs. 
3.  Voluntary programs can be a good way of inducing environmental 
performance improvements in the small business sector which is often 
not subject to the stringent environmental regulations that big industry 
is. 
6.1.  What are Voluntary Environmental Management Arrangements 
(VEMAs)? 
Voluntary environmental management arrangements, or VEMAs, include a 
diverse set of arrangements in which businesses, and in some cases other 
organisations, voluntarily enhance environmental management.  As their 
name implies, all VEMAs share two common features—they are concerned 
with environmental management and they are undertaken voluntarily.  Thus, 
‘VEMA’ is an umbrella term embracing many very different types of 
arrangements including environmental management systems (EMSs) such as 
ISO14001, as well as various production protocols that may be part of 
environmental certification schemes and environmental labelling initiatives.   VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
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Some but not all VEMAs result in certification or labelling.  VEMAs are 
‘voluntary’ in the sense that participation in them is not prescribed by law.  
However, the uptake of VEMAs including verifiable compliance against 
specific criteria and standards may be a precondition of entry to some 
markets (Mech and Young, 2001). Individual VEMAs are distinguished from 
one another by differences in their key design features.  Key design features 
are denoted by terms such as ‘standards’, ‘auditing’, ‘certification’ and 
‘labelling’.  The design specifics of different VEMAs, notably the standards 
they incorporate as well as the ways in which these are audited, certified 
and/or labelled, and by whom, define the differences among VEMAs.  Also, 
the design specifics determine how much environmental outcomes are 
actually enhanced by the implementation of a given VEMA (Mech and Young, 
2001). 
6.2.  Types of VEMAs 
The key to understanding VEMAs lies in understanding the standards or 
criteria that are audited in different environmental certification and 
labelling schemes.  A typology for classifying VEMA standards is presented in 
Box 5 below. These standards determine the nature of the green claims that 
can be made in the event of a successful third party audit.  Also, the nature 
of the audit, that is to say whether it is conducted internally or externally or 
both, and the nature and identity of the body or authority conducting 
external auditing and making labelling recommendations and decisions, 
convey different messages in the marketplace regarding the levels of 
certainty, even trustworthiness, associated with the environmental claims 
made.  Thus, the design specifics determine the level of consumer 
confidence and marketplace recognition associated with different schemes 
(Mech and Young, 2001). 
Box 5  Types of Environmental Standards in VEMAs 
Standards are “accepted specifications or codes of practice which define 
materials, methods, processes and practices that, when effectively 
implemented, ensure that consistent and acceptable levels of quality, 
performance, safety and reliability are achieved.”  (Standards Australia, 
2001). 
Different types of environmental standards exist, and according to Ure’s 
(1999) categorisation, there are two groups of environmental standards: 
   organisation-oriented standards, also called process standards; and  
   production-oriented standards, which may be product standards or 
performance standards. 
Process standards specify management processes and procedures to be 
followed by an organisation for the purposes of environmental management.  
Product standards may define specific features of a final product and may also 
define how that product must have been produced.  Performance standards 
specify acceptable or required levels of performance to be met.  
Environmental performance standards may relate to the production process, as 
well as to environmental externalities stemming from the production process. 
Source:  Mech and Young (2001) 
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In general terms there are four types of VEMAs that may result in some form 
of environmental certification and labelling. 
1.  VEMAs based on organisation-oriented standards, or process standards.  
These are environmental management systems (EMSs) such as the 
European Union’s Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) and 
ISO 14001. 
2.  VEMAs based on production-oriented standards, or product and 
performance standards, such as the Integrated Fruit Production (IFP) 
protocols. 
3.  VEMAs based on a blend of organisation-oriented and production-
oriented standards including EUREP-GAP, Organic Standards, the 
Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) scheme, the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) and the Finnish Forest Certification Scheme (FFCS). 
4.  A group of environmental labelling and eco-labelling schemes in the 
ISO 14020 series of standards that allow for three environmental 
labelling possibilities known as Type I, Type II and Type III labelling. 
(Mech and Young, 2001). 
An example of a VEMA that is well recognised in Australia and internationally 
is the ISO 14001 standard explained in Box 6 below.  
Box 6   ISO 14001 
The International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001 standard is an 
internationally standardised guideline for design of environmental 
management systems ( s). A firm that is ISO 14001 certified has an EMS in 
place that adheres to five principles: 
1.  An EMS Policy is in place that includes a commitment to prevention of 
pollution and complies with all relevant environmental legislation and 
regulation. 
2.  A planning procedure is in place that sets environmental objectives 
to address all of the firms activities, products and services that can 
have significant environmental impact and programs are in place to 
achieve the objectives. 
3.  Implementation and operational procedures are in place including 
clearly defined environmental management responsibility to meet all 
environmental objectives, and full documentation of all environmental 
management actions and outcomes. 
4.  Systems for checking, measuring and monitoring environmental 
performance are in place that include periodic environmental 
auditing, and procedures to implement corrections in cases of non-
compliance. 
5.  A system is in place to review the EMS including procedures to ensure 
changes are made to guarantee continuous improvement. 
Source: Heinze, 2000 
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6.3.  Existing VEMAs in the Onkaparinga Catchment Area 
Both the OCWMB and the SA Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) already 
have voluntary programs in place to promote environmental management by 
Catchment businesses. While none of the existing program result in 
environmental certification or labelling, they do contribute to improved 
environmental management.  Most notable among VEMA programs in the 
Catchment area is the “Aware 2000 Sustainable Industry” initiative 
sponsored by the OCWMB and the City of Onkaparinga. 
The "Aware 2000 Sustainable Industry" program involves a full-time officer 
who visits local small businesses such as auto repair shops to review current 
business practices and make suggestions for improvements to minimise 
potential for adverse water quality impacts of business practices. The 
program emphasis is on: 
  storm water drain placement; 
  waste water management; 
  hazardous waste management; 
  hazardous waste spill control; and 
  water and energy conservation. 
In addition the program co-sponsors EPA small business eco-efficiency 
workshops and is developing a reference group of area small business leaders 
who will mentor other area businesses in environmental management.  
Another innovative EPA initiative is the Greener Business Alliance Project. 
”A chief aim of this project is to improve the environmental performance of 
businesses along a supply chain through a series of cooperative agreements 
between the EPA, a medium to large sized business that acts as a mentor, 
and a select number of its suppliers. The term 'supplier' refers to a company 
providing goods and/or services. 
It is the suppliers that the project is looking to influence because they are 
typically smaller enterprises, environmentally unlicensed and potentially 
less eco-efficient. While the environmental impact of each individual 
supplier may be small, the accumulated effects across the supply chain can 
be significant. 
The EPA has recently selected the Yalumba Wine Company to be a mentor. 
Eight suppliers to Yalumba have entered into a three-way eco-efficiency 
agreement with Yalumba and the EPA. The eco-efficiency agreements 
contain a commitment to develop an action plan with set negotiated 
environmental goals for the suppliers. They also establish a commitment on 
the part of suppliers to allow the benefits achieved to be promoted.”
8 
                                             
8 Source: SA EPA Eco-Efficiency Web site 
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6.4.  VEMA Opportunities for Viticulture and Horticulture 
Viticulture and horticulture are the most important irrigated agricultural 
activities in the catchment area. A total of nearly 14,000 ha of irrigated 
cropland were reported in the catchment area in 1999, with 9,294 ha in 
vineyards and 3,798 ha in horticultural crops and orchards. There are several 
compelling reasons to believe that the timing is right for developing VEMA 
opportunities for viticulture and horticulture within the Onkaparinga 
Catchment area. 
1.  Discussion with the Adelaide Hills Grape Growers (AHGG) 
representative Michael Bowe suggests that community acceptance of 
viticultural production practice is the single most important force 
driving the environmental regulatory agenda. The group would like to 
move from a reactive to a proactive position on the issue. 
2.  International experience suggests that there are excellent 
opportunities to address community and market concerns related to 
the environmental impacts of viticulture using voluntary approaches.  
Many techniques to address environmental issues in horticulture and 
viticulture can save growers money. Successful voluntary orchard and 
viticulture initiatives are outlined in the Boxes 7 and 8 below.  
Box 7  Economic Evaluation HRDC/AAPGA Program 
Existing research confirms that voluntary environmental programs in 
agriculture can be expected to lead to “eco-efficiency” gains that save 
growers input cost and reduce the environmental impact of farming. For 
example, a report to the Horticultural Research and Development Council 
(HRDC), evaluated the impact of the $3.55 million invested in voluntary 
integrated pest management (IPM) programs by HRDC and the Australian 
Apple and Pear Growers Association (AAPGA) between 1991 and 1999.  
The study found that the growers participating in the IPM program reduced 
average sprays by 23% and achieved an average 15% (approximately, 
$150/ha) savings in pesticide input costs. Estimated financial benefits to 
growers alone exceeded the cost of the investment by a ratio of 1.5:1, and 
significant public and private environmental and health benefits also 
resulted.  
Source: Anon, 1999 
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Box 8  The Oregon Wine Advisory Board LIVE Program 
The Low Input Viticulture & Enology Program (LIVE) is a peak industry group 
program providing Oregon, U.S.A. vineyards and wineries recognition for 
adopting sustainable agricultural practices. It is an example of a viticulture-
focused VEMA without third party certification that can be locally adopted 
and implemented at relatively low cost. Initial program development was a 
grower effort funded by a small government sustainable agriculture grant. 
On-going costs of program administration are financed through peak industry 
group membership dues of US$100/year and the volunteer auditing efforts of 
a retired wine grower. The strength of the program is its focus on provision 
of guidance regarding best ecological practice in wine production and a 
framework that growers can use to evaluate self-improvement. The 
certification program involves providing participants with a list of vineyard 
prohibited practices, required practices and ecologically desirable practices 
in six areas. 
  Biodiversity practices include requirements and options for botanical 
diversity of cover crops, and untreated biological compensation areas 
on vineyards. 
  Cover cropping and weed control practices include requirements and 
options for % of vineyard floor in crop cover, setback from streams 
and wetlands, % of vineyard sprayed with herbicide, and non-
herbicide weed control. 
  Disease and Pest Control practices include requirements and options 
for sprayer inspection and calibration, rates of specific pesticides 
applied, and cluster exposure and canopy density 
  Fertility Management practices include requirements and options 
related to soil and plant tissue nutrient testing, quantities of specific 
nutrients applied, and application timing. 
  Irrigation practices include requirements and options related to 
irrigation and soil moisture monitoring, quantities of water applied, 
and application timing. 
  New Planting practices include requirements and options related to 
stock type (certified and resistant varieties, and rootstock), soil 
testing, and pH adjustment at planting. 
Evaluation is based on a three page score card growers submit that 
summarises fertility, and pesticide input use, as well as cultural management 
practices. To be certified a grower must:  
1.  adhere to all required practice guidelines (i.e. have vineyard in cover 
crop over winter); and  
2.  obtain at least one half of the possible 280 points for good ecological 
practices  (i.e. in disease control –10 points if 0% of cluster is visible, 
+10 if >30% is visible, +20 if >50%). 
The group does not see the scorecard as an endpoint or a way to exclude 
growers but rather as the beginning of a process of continuous management 
improvement. Thus, the scoring system often gives negative points for less 
desirable practices rather than prohibiting the practice altogether. 
Participants are inspected at least once a year at unannounced times to 
verify self-reporting accuracy. 
Sources: LIVE web site - http://www.liveinc.org/index.htm, and personal 
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6.5. VEMA  Recommendations 
The OCWMB is well positioned to participate with Commonwealth and State 
agencies that are currently developing policies relating to VEMAs and 
relevant businesses and other organisations within the catchment that could 
adopt VEMAs.  In this way, the OCWMB may promote VEMAs in viticulture, 
and other agricultural and horticultural activities, within its boundaries.  
An opportunity for the OCWMB exists because while interest in VEMA 
development is high, peak industry organisations like AHGG probably will not 
take initiative without some support. In part, this is because developing a 
successful voluntary approach requires significant work to: 
  develop local best management practice (BMP) guidelines; 
  develop environmental standards and criteria, promote their 
implementation, and review them on an on-going basis; and 
  design certification procedures that are recognised in the marketplace 
and by the community. 
Where such initiatives are arising (the Margaret River region of WA and the 
Yarra and Golden Valleys of Victoria), local or state governments have 
committed limited funding to development in the recognition that required 
work is beyond what industry groups are likely to provide on a volunteer 
basis in committee work. 
The OCWMB may wish to encourage VEMA adoption within its boundaries 
by partnering with emerging State and Commonwealth initiatives in this 
area and by offering incentive to businesses that adopt voluntary 
environmental management on their own. 
In line with the Coalition's new policy on EMSs, the Commonwealth 
Government has committed to funding 15 pilot projects for developing EMSs 
in agriculture and allied rural industries across Australia.  The Board may 
wish to consider submitting a proposal to undertake such a pilot VEMA 
initiative within the Onkaparinga Catchment area in partnership with 
relevant State and Commonwealth agencies.  Essentially, the aim of such a 
regional pilot project would be to foster on-farm development of EMSs, with 
relevant environmental performance guidelines, on enough farms within a 
catchment to investigate the potential of EMSs to meet catchment natural 
resource management goals. 
As an incentive to participate in VEMAs, the Board may wish to consider  
catchment levy and/or Council rate rebates for businesses, and/or other 
organisations, that adopt systems of environmental management consistent 
with ISO14001.  It is proposed that having served the purpose of an 
implementation incentive such rebates would be phased out.  This incentive 
would be in addition to the Commonwealth’s proposed income tax rebate of 
$3,000 for low income farmers who implement EMSs.  C ONCLUSIONS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 
   INCENTIVES, POLICY AND VOLUNTARY APPROACHES  PAGE 34 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The result of this report is a set of recommendations about how the OCWMB, 
other state agencies and private business can improve ecological, economic 
and social outcomes in four areas of strategic interest to the OCWMB:  
  conservation Incentives  
  urban water conservation 
  groundwater and farm dam water allocation policy and 
  voluntary environmental management arrangements. 
Conservation Incentives 
The largest single expenditure category in the 2001 Onkaparinga Catchment 
Water Management Plan is rehabilitation and management of waterways 
through incentive payments to private landholders.  Between 2000 and 2003, 
$3.15M (or 36% of the entire $8.75M three year budget) is earmarked for 
spending in this category (OCWMB, 2001). Consequently this is a very 
important policy area for the Board to consider.  
Perhaps the most significant limitation of the current approach is that the 
return per cost-sharing dollar is less than could be achieved. This is because, 
at the present, cost-sharing payments are the same, irrespective of 
landholder willingness and capacity to contribute conservation effort. 
This report describes an OCWMB opportunity to adopt a tendering system to 
conservation investment similar to the Victorian Bush-Tender approach.  The 
approach provides a mechanism enabling landholders who are willing to 
undertake conservation works at less than the current rate the opportunity 
to do so.  
Evaluation of the first year of experience with the Victorian Bush-Tender 
approach found that the agency attained approximately 33% more 
environmental protection effort for its $400,000 cost-sharing expenditure 
than it would have had it cost-shared at a single pre-set rate (Stoneham, 
Chaudhri, Ha and Strappazzon, 2002). Realising similar improvements in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment is possible. 
Opportunities may exist to fund, at least partially, development of such a 
tendering system through Commonwealth grants. Pilot programs to 
demonstrate cost saving environmental program design are a high priority of 
the emerging National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality – Market 
Based Instruments initiative. C ONCLUSIONS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 
   INCENTIVES, POLICY AND VOLUNTARY APPROACHES  PAGE 35 
Urban Water Conservation 
Several policy changes and programs can be pursued by the OCWMB and 
other government agencies to enhance urban water conservation including:  
1.  Expanding informational materials describing “best bet” household 
water conservation measures. At the present, the Board sponsors 
two voluntary information programs in the catchment area—“Water 
Care” and the “Aware 2000 Sustainable Industry” program. 
Incorporation of information explaining financial returns to "best bet" 
conservation practices into these programs is likely to increase 
adoption. 
2.  Leading an effort to develop a “five frog” water efficiency program 
similar to the five star energy efficiency rating scheme used in the 
Australian Capital Territory.  
3.  Developing a landscape water demand management program In 
partnership with local government Councils or Utilities.  Such a 
program would involve an officer visiting businesses and public 
institutions with large irrigated grounds, performing an irrigation 
system hardware and management evaluation, making 
recommendations, and perhaps offering water saving technology 
investment financing or incentives. 
4.  Encouraging water and energy performance contractors to focus on 
the Onkaparinga Catchment area. This relatively new type of 
business involves private companies identifying areas where water use 
is inefficient and then entering into a shared savings agreement with 
water and energy users.  Typically, a water and energy performance 
contractor identifies ways to install water saving equipment, pays for 
all or part of the installation costs and then receives part of the value 
of the savings in energy and water consumption costs. 
Groundwater in the McLaren Vale 
Research carried out for this report concluded that, to date, the restrictions 
on water use imposed on irrigators through the MVPWA Water Allocation Plan 
have not had significant adverse economic consequences. This, however, 
does not mean that aquifer use is now sustainable. Ongoing monitoring is 
necessary and, at some date in the future, it is likely that further changes 
will be necessary.  
One improvement in water allocation rules the OCWMB may wish to consider 
is denominating future allocations both as a share of Permissible Annual 
Volume and as a water volume.  This approach would put in place a 
mechanism for adjusting allocations in future water allocation plans. If 
monitoring shows that PAV has been overestimated then the share system 
facilitates adjustment of everyone’s allocation on a pro rata basis. C ONCLUSIONS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 
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Farm Dam Policy 
Reduction in environmental flow in certain sub-catchment streams as the 
result of farm dam water capture is an increasing concern in the 
Onkaparinga Catchment.  
To reduce potential adverse impact of farm dams, one of the simplest 
approaches is to cap farm dam development and make the issuance of new 
dam permits subject to off-set provisions.  Under such an arrangement, in 
order to obtain a permit to construct a dam, an aspiring dam developer 
would have to off-set their proposed development by arranging to have 
another dam of equal or greater size in the same sub-catchment removed.  
Off-set provisions provide some flexibility for economic development in the 
future while maintaining controls over potential adverse impacts of 
development. 
There are two ways of achieving this outcome. The first is by recommending 
to the Government that they prescribe the entire Onkaparinga Catchment 
area. The second is to work with local government councils to achieve the 
same outcome via development controls. 
Voluntary Environmental Management Arrangements  
There are good reasons to believe that OCWMB investments in voluntary 
approaches may yield significant improvements in catchment resource 
management outcomes. There are at least two opportunities that the 
OCWMB may wish consider as means of promoting voluntary environmental 
management efforts in the catchment. 
1.  As an incentive to participate in voluntary environmental management 
arrangements (VEMAs), the Board may wish to consider catchment levy 
and/or council rate rebates.  For example, rebates could be offered to 
businesses that initiate voluntary environmental management systems 
that comply with the internationally recognised ISO14001 standard.  It 
is proposed that having served the purpose of an implementation 
incentive, such rebates would be phased out.  This incentive would be 
in addition to the Commonwealth’s proposed income tax rebate of 
$3,000 for low income farmers who implement EMSs. 
2.  The OCWMB may wish to consider participation in Commonwealth-
funded pilot projects for VEMAS in agriculture and allied rural 
industries.  The Commonwealth Government has committed to funding 
15 pilot projects for developing environmental management systems 
(EMSs) in agriculture and allied rural industries across Australia.  The 
Board may wish to consider submitting a proposal to undertake such a 
pilot initiative within the Onkaparinga Catchment area in partnership 
with relevant State and Commonwealth agencies.  Essentially, the aim 
of such a regional pilot project would be to foster on-farm 
development of EMSs, with relevant environmental performance 
guidelines, on enough farms within a catchment to investigate the 
potential of EMSs to meet catchment natural resource management 
goals. R EFERENCES 
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